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California’s coastal cities have contemplated regulating short-
term lodging units (STLU), like those offered on Airbnb. Many 
cities do so to appease residents complaining of STLUs disrupting 
their neighborhoods. Grievances include noise, insufficient local 
parking, and disruption of community character. However, the 
California Coastal Commission (the Commission) has asserted its 
authority under the California Coastal Act of 1976 (the Coastal Act) 
in an effort to prevent cities from regulating STLUs without first 
obtaining Commission approval. The Coastal Act empowers the 
Commission to protect public access to the coast, and the 
Commission has designated STLUs as a vital source of that access.1 
Although zoning and nuisance regulation traditionally fit within 
cities’ police power, the Commission has final authority over all 
“development” in the coastal zone, as delineated in the Coastal 
Act.2 The Commission interprets “development” to include STLU 
regulation and uses that broad definition to effectively require 
cities to get approval before passing any new restrictions, thereby 
giving the Commission unprecedented authority over cities’ 
zoning power. 
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the Commission’s history 
of providing public access to low-cost overnight accommodations 
in the coastal zone as it relates to its current efforts to limit 
municipal STLU regulations. The Commission’s broad historic 
view of its authority under the Coastal Act is reflected in its 
approach to limiting local regulation of STLUs. Currently, the 
Commission asserts its authority over municipal STLU regulation 
in two ways: (1) its review and issuance of coastal development 
permits in coastal areas where the Commission has direct 
permitting authority; and (2) its review and approval of Local 
Coastal Programs before delegating permitting authority to cities 
and counties. In both areas, the Commission must walk a line 
between its legitimate review of land use decisions for their impacts 
on coastal access and its impairment of local government’s common 
law authority to do the same in pursuit of its own legitimate 
objectives. In areas where the Commission has direct permitting 
 
 1. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 30000–30900 (West 2018). 
 2. Id.; see id. § 30200. 
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authority, it asserts a broad interpretation of “development” that 
includes local land use and nuisance regulations, especially 
limitations on STLUs that only pose a potential—as opposed to 
actual—change in land use.  
Several cities have challenged the Commission’s practice at the 
trial court level. State courts have historically upheld the 
Commission’s broad interpretation of what constitutes 
“development.” Federal courts, in contrast, seem less willing to 
uphold the Commission’s broad definition of “development.” 
Neither has struck a clear balance between the Commission’s 
preemptive authority to intervene when coastal land use decisions 
limit public access and cities’ traditional police power to protect 
single-family residential neighborhoods. The Commission’s 
current interpretation of “development” encroaches on coastal 
cities’ police power and poses significant risks to public welfare. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Coastal Act disputes in California are usually between the 
regulated (property owners) and the regulator (the Commission). 
In the case of STLUs, however, the Commission and property 
owners are more likely to be aligned in their support of short-term 
rental of residential homes against cities and neighbors concerned 
about their nuisance effects.3 Many property owners favor STLUs 
because owners can convert their unused property into income 
with higher rents charged for short-term use, especially during 
peak seasons. The Commission asserts authority over STLUs in the 
interest of providing low-cost accommodations on the coast.  
Cities choose to regulate STLUs because the properties threaten 
neighborhood stability, affordable housing stock, and public welfare. 
A. Rise in STLU Popularity 
STLUs have risen in popularity with the advent of home 
sharing websites like Airbnb. Airbnb is an online platform that 
connects hosts with travelers looking for overnight accommodation 
around the world and offers unique advantages for both hosts  
 
 3. See Homeaway.com, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, No. 2:16-cv-06641-ODW, 2018 
WL 1281772, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2018). 
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and guests.4 These competitive advantages have contributed to 
Airbnb’s popularity and have drawn the regulatory attention of 
coastal cities. Since its launch and subsequent success, Airbnb has 
generated substantial controversy.5 However, this Note will only 
address the controversies necessary to provide context for the 
Commission’s resistance to STLU regulation. 
Property owners or leaseholders may become hosts by listing 
their spaces on Airbnb’s website with custom prices, schedules, and 
guest requirements.6 Hosts can rent entire properties or individual 
rooms.7 This flexibility allows hosts to generate income from 
properties they already own, including those in single-family 
residential neighborhoods. 
Travelers connect with potential hosts by creating an Airbnb 
profile and browsing available accommodations.8 Travelers can 
often find cheaper and more interesting accommodations than 
hotels, such as coastal beach houses.9 Across the world, options 
range from cheap, single rooms in an apartment to igloos to 
extravagant castles.10 Because Airbnb allows hosts to list properties 
in primarily residential areas, travelers can also find more local 
accommodation experiences than they find at hotels.11 
Airbnb’s flexibility for hosts and attractiveness to travelers 
draws investors as well. Through Airbnb’s platform, savvy 
investors convert residential properties into units that “operate 
year-round essentially as independent, unlicensed hotel rooms.”12 
In fact, “64% of Airbnb listings in Los Angeles . . . are never 
 
 4. Alexander W. Cloonan, The New American Home: Look at the Legal Issues Surrounding 
Airbnb and Short-Term Rentals, 42 U. DAYTON L. REV. 27, 31 (2017). 
 5. Id. at 32. 
 6. Hosting in 3 Steps, AIRBNB (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.airbnb.com/host/homes. 
 7. Dayne Lee, How Airbnb Short-Term Rentals Exacerbate Los Angeles’s Affordable 
Housing Crisis: Analysis and Policy Recommendations, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 229, 232 (2016). 
 8. How Do I Search for a Place to Stay?, AIRBNB (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www. 
airbnb.com/help/article/252/how-do-i-search-for-a-place-to-stay. 
 9. This fact is hotly contested between cities and STLU hosts. Hosts claim that 
extended families can rent an entire house for less than multiple hotel rooms. Cities argue 
that STLUs are not inherently cheaper options and that affordability depends on the actual 
price. See Anthem Sales & Mgmt., LLC v. City of San Clemente, No. SACV 18-01359-
CJC(JDEx), at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2018) (STLU in question rented for $1000 per night). 
 10. Cloonan, supra note 4, at 28. 
 11. Lee, supra note 7, at 232. 
 12. Id. at 234. 
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occupied by their owners or leaseholders.”13 But unlike hotels, 
hosts and guests often do not pay hotel occupancy taxes, potentially 
making them cheaper for travelers.14 
B. Cities 
California cities regulate neighborhoods in the interest of 
protecting public welfare by exercising its police power.15 The 
concept of public welfare is broad and includes concerns of 
“[p]ublic safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, [and] law 
and order,” or even things that “suffocate the spirit” of city 
residents or neighborhoods.16 Cities do this by regulating behavior, 
for example, by passing laws that require licenses for property 
management or other businesses, or adopting limitations on noise 
and on-street parking. Cities can also do this through zoning 
ordinances that designate certain areas of town for certain uses. 
STLU regulations can fall within both categories of regulations. The 
line between passing behavior laws and passing zoning ordinances 
is somewhat blurry, and STLU regulations can fall within both of 
these categories. It is difficult to determine what portion of this 
continuum of municipal police power is preempted by the 
Commission’s authority to protect coastal access. 
California cities regulate general land use through a general 
plan and a zoning code. A city’s general plan must include a land 
use element that designates the distribution, location, and extent of 
different land uses.17 Generally, a city’s more specific zoning 
ordinances must be consistent with its general plan.18 A city’s 
zoning ordinances are considered quasi-legislative acts and 
therefore are only rejected by reviewing courts if they are 
“arbitrary, capricious, or totally lacking in evidentiary support.”19 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Cloonan, supra note 4, at 32. 
 15. CECILY TALBERT BARCLAY & MATTHEW S. GRAY, CALIFORNIA LAND USE & 
PLANNING LAW 1 (2016). While traditionally associated with states, California cities enjoy a 
broad police power over municipal affairs under the California Constitution. DeVita v. Cty. 
of Napa, 889 P.2d 1019, 1030 (Cal. 1995). 
 16. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32–33 (1954). 
 17. CITY ATT’YS’ DEP’T & LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, THE CALIFORNIA MUNICIPAL LAW 
HANDBOOK § 10.18 (2018). 
 18. Id. §§ 10.89–.90. 
 19. Id. § 10.92. 
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Under their police power, cities also have the authority to 
regulate nuisance in order to protect public welfare.20 This includes 
the power to prohibit anything that obstructs the free use of 
property or comfortable enjoyment of property.21 Cities seeking to 
regulate STLUs may do so under this power if STLUs pose a threat 
to neighbors’ comfortable enjoyment of their property. Examples of 
potential STLU nuisance regulation include limiting the impacts 
STLUs have on street parking, trash pickup, and community 
comfort.22 Conducting business without a license also constitutes 
nuisance per se and may be enjoined.23 
Cities also have the authority to regulate STLUs as businesses.24 
While long-term rentals (greater than thirty days) are a 
constitutionally protected property right, short-term rentals (less 
than thirty days) are a commercial activity.25 Commercial 
regulations on STLUs range from registration requirements to 
outright bans.26 As with traditional visitor-oriented uses like hotels 
and bed and breakfasts, cities commonly regulate STLUs by 
imposing time limits, maximum guest limits, inspections, and 
limits on the total rental days per year.27 
A city’s police power encompasses regulating STLUs as land 
uses, nuisances, and business activities. These types of STLU 
restriction seem to fit together on an overlapping continuum. A 
land use ordinance may restrict specific commercial uses, like 
hosting an STLU, in residential areas. A nuisance ordinance may 
protect community character by prohibiting activities incidental to 
the presence of STLUs, effectively prohibiting them. A business 
activity regulation may restrict STLU permits to specific locations 
where the community is well-suited to accommodate transient 
visitors. All three categories of police power exercise allow for a de 
facto prohibition on STLUs. Although different by name, each of 
these categories fits into a city’s ability to regulate neighborhoods 
within its boundaries. 
 
 20. Id. § 9.121. 
 21. Id. § 9.122; see also CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (West 2018). 
 22. CITY ATT’YS’ DEP’T & LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, supra note 17, §§ 9.122–.123. 
 23. City of Claremont v. Kruse, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Ct. App. 2009). 
 24. CITY ATT’YS’ DEP’T & LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, supra note 17, § 9.52B. 
 25. Id. § 9.52A. 
 26. Id. § 9.52B. 
 27. Id. § 9.52D. 
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Most California cities can regulate STLUs as they see fit. Coastal 
cities, however, are subject to the Commission’s preemptive 
authority to protect STLUs. The Commission has chosen to do this 
by expanding its traditional role of reviewing physical development 
in coastal areas to reviewing cities’ nuisance and business 
regulations under a broad interpretation of “development” in the 
Coastal Act. 
C. California Coastal Commission and the Coastal Act 
In 1976, the California legislature adopted the Coastal Act, 
declaring California’s coastal zone “a distinct and valuable natural 
resource of vital and enduring interest.”28 It further declared that 
“existing developed uses[] and future developments . . . are 
essential to the economic and social well-being of the people of  
this state.”29 The Commission administers the Coastal Act by 
“plan[ning] and regulat[ing] the use of land and water in the coastal 
zone” in coordination with coastal cities.30 
The coastal zone was mapped by California’s legislature and 
includes a three-mile-wide band of ocean and a variable width of 
land along the entire coastline, minus San Francisco Bay and a few 
other exceptions.31 The coastal zone overlaps with fifteen counties 
and sixty-one cities.32 The Commission and these cities and counties 
implement the Coastal Act by preparing Local Coastal Programs 
(LCP) that include a land use plan, which is similar to a city’s 
general plan, and an implementation plan, which is similar to a 
city’s zoning code.33 A city may submit its land use plan and 
implementation plan or get its land use plan approved first and 
submit an implementation plan later. 
Any “development” in the coastal zone cannot begin without a 
coastal development permit from the Commission or from a local 
government in areas where the Commission has delegated 
 
 28. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE ANN. § 30001(a) (West 2018). 
 29. Id. § 30001(d). 
 30. Our Mission, CAL. COASTAL COMM’N (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.coastal.ca. 
gov/whoweare.html. 
 31. Id. These exceptions are often governed by other authorities in addition to counties 
and cities. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
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permitting authority through an approved LCP.34 In areas without 
LCPs, applicants must seek local land use and building permit 
approvals from the city and separate coastal development permits 
from the Commission. In areas with approved LCPs, cities have the 
ability to issue all permits as long as their issuance of coastal 
development permits is consistent with the requirements of an 
LCP.35 The Commission must approve any amendments to an 
LCP.36 Any city development also requires a coastal development 
permit from the Commission.37 
According to the Commission, “[t]he Coastal Act defines 
development broadly . . . to include not only typical land 
development activities such as construction of buildings, but also 
changes in the intensity of use of land or water, even where no 
construction is involved.”38 Under this definition, examples of 
“development” include discharging a fireworks display over a 
river estuary and a property owner limiting historical public access 
to the coast over her private property.39 
The Commission evaluates LCPs for conformance with Coastal 
Act policies upon submission and every five years after that.40 One 
such policy is to “[m]aximize public access to and along the coast 
and maximize public recreational opportunities in the coastal zone 
consistent with sound resources conservation principles and 
constitutionally protected rights of private property owners.”41 
The Commission’s primary interaction with cities occurs upon 
LCP submission and approval. During this interaction, the 
Commission’s power is limited to approving or denying the LCP.42 
However, the Commission has effectively expanded its power to 
 
 34. Id. 
 35. Local Coastal Programs, CAL. COASTAL COMM’N (Dec. 31, 2018), https://www. 
coastal.ca.gov/lcps.html. 
 36. Local Coastal Programs: Resources for Local Governments, CAL. COASTAL COMM’N 
(Dec. 31, 2018), https://www.coastal.ca.gov/rflg/. 
 37. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE ANN. § 30600(a) (West 2018); id. § 21066 (“person” includes a city). 
 38. Coastal Development: Permit Applications and Appeal Forms, CAL. COASTAL COMM’N, 
coastal.ca.gov/cdp/cdp-forms.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2019). 
 39. Gualala Festivals Comm. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 908, 909 (Ct. 
App. 2010); Surfrider Found. v. Martins Beach 1, LLC, 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d 382, 389 (Ct. App. 
2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018). 
 40. Our Mission, supra note 30. 
 41. PUB. RES. § 30001.5(c). 
 42. See San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 238 Cal. Rptr. 3d 671  
(Ct. App. 2018). 
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review city ordinances outside of the LCP process, especially STLU 
regulations, by considering them development under the Coastal 
Act, inasmuch as the ordinance decreases the supply of affordable 
overnight accommodation in the coastal zone. The Commission 
argues that STLU restrictions constitute “development” because 
they change the intensity of use and access to the shoreline.43 Thus, 
the Commission argues that STLU restrictions must be authorized 
by a coastal development permit, issued by the Commission, and 
conformed to the Coastal Act’s policy to provide affordable 
overnight accommodations.44 
The Commission acknowledges that STLUs pose a threat to 
public welfare but “has not historically supported blanket [STLU] 
bans” because such restrictions are not consistent with the Coastal 
Act’s affordable accommodation policies.45 The Commission has 
only approved partial STLU bans, including regulations that limit 
the total number of rental units in certain areas, the types of 
housing that can be converted to STLUs, the maximum STLU 
occupancy, and the amount of time a given unit may be rented 
during a given time period.46 The Commission has also approved 
requirements for 24-hour management or emergency response, for 
parking, for noise limits, for transient occupancy taxes, and for 
specific signage posting important information.47 
Although the Commission paints itself as willing to cooperate 
with cities to impose reasonable regulations on STLUs, it is peculiar 
that the Commission is involved at all. Outside of approving an 
LCP, the Commission is not involved in cities’ day-to-day general 
plan resolutions or zoning ordinances, let alone nuisance and 
business activity regulation. However, under the guise of 
overseeing “development” in the coastal zone, the Commission 
now supervises traditional applications of cities’ police power. 
 
 43. Opinion Letter from Cal. Coastal Comm’n to Coastal Planning/Cmty. Dev. Dirs. 
(Dec. 6, 2016) (discussing short-term and vacation rentals in the California coastal zone). 
 44. Id. at 1. 
 45. Id. at 2. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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D. Status Quo 
Under the Commission’s current view of the regulatory 
scheme, a city must either amend its LCP to contemplate STLU 
regulations or, since STLU regulations constitute “development,” 
obtain a coastal development permit to authorize any STLU 
restriction.  Either way, a city must receive approval from the 
Commission to regulate STLUs, and the Commission has stated 
that it will only approve certain limitations to public overnight 
accommodations.48 Some cities have successfully challenged the 
Commission’s status quo while others have struggled to loosen the 
grip on STLU regulations.49 
III. HISTORY OF THE COMMISSION’S EFFORTS  
TO PROVIDE OVERNIGHT ACCOMMODATIONS 
Section 30213 of the Coastal Act requires that the Commission 
protect, encourage, and provide “[l]ower cost visitor and 
recreational facilities.”50 The Commission has tried to do this in 
several ways. Categorizing city STLU restrictions as 
“development” is the newest iteration in a pattern of less-than-
straightforward assertions of Coastal Act authority by the 
Commission to provide low-cost overnight accommodations. 
A. ZIP Code Rates 
In 1981, California legislators amended § 30213 of the Coastal 
Act in response to concerns that the Commission overreached its 
authority in the regulation of hotel development.51 
In order to increase public access to overnight accommodation, 
the Commission essentially required hotels to rent some of their 
units at a reduced rate to moderate income guests, all under the 
auspices of reviewing “development” to ensure coastal access.52  
 
 48. Id. 
 49. See infra Part V. 
 50. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE ANN. § 30213 (West 2018). 
 51. David Francis Pierucci, The California Coastal Commission’s Approach to Lower 
Coast Overnight Visitor-Serving Accommodations Mitigation: A Policy and Legal Analysis 
11 (2015) (unpublished thesis, California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo) 
(available at https://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/theses/1417). 
 52. Paul A. Sabatier & Daniel A. Mazmanian, CAN REGULATION WORK?: THE 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 1972 CALIFORNIA COASTAL INITIATIVE 333 (1983). 
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In one case, the Commission accepted a hotel owner’s offer to 
reserve forty-five rooms during weekends at 50% of the normal rate 
for guests from certain zip codes.53 In 1981, likely in response to 
what they saw as an overreach by the Commission, state legislators 
added a provision to § 30213 forbidding the Commission from 
fixing room rates or “establish[ing] or approv[ing] any method for 
the identification of low or moderate income persons for the 
purpose of determining eligibility for overnight room rentals in any 
such facilities.”54 
B. San Diego Unified Port District 
In 2015, the San Diego Unified Port District, which interacts 
with the Commission on essentially the same basis as a city, 
submitted a port master plan55 amendment for Commission 
approval.56 The original plan contemplated a single 500-room hotel, 
while the amendment allowed for three hotels to provide a 
combined total of 500 rooms.57 The Commission denied the 
amendment on the grounds that it did not provide lower-cost 
overnight accommodations with sufficient specificity, even though 
the plan generally acknowledged that developers provide their fair 
share of low-cost accommodations or pay an in-lieu fee.58 
Normally, under § 30714, the Commission simply approves or 
denies a plan according to whether it is consistent with the policies 
in the Coastal Act, and it may not make a modification as a 
condition for certification, such as requiring a precise, explicit 
change to the plan.59 San Diego Unified Port District took issue with 
the Commission’s denial, claiming the Commission had exceeded 
its jurisdiction under the Coastal Act by infringing on the port 
district’s discretion to determine the specifics of the port master 
plan.60 The trial court agreed, ruling in the Port’s favor.61 
 
 53. Id. 
 54. PUB. RES. § 30213; Pierucci, supra note 51, at 10. 
 55. The functional equivalent of an LCP. 
 56. San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 238 Cal. Rptr. 3d 671, 676 
(Ct. App. 2018). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 677. 
 59. PUB. RES. § 30714. 
 60. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 238 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 675. 
 61. Id. 
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On appeal, however, the reviewing court held that the Coastal 
Act only forbids “conditionally approving” a plan and requires that 
the Commission provide specific reasons for denial, such as public 
access deficiencies.62 Essential to this ruling, the court rejected the 
trial court’s reasoning that port districts and cities possess 
analogous authority. Rather, the court explained, port districts do 
not enjoy the same broad discretion to determine the precise 
contents of land use and implementation plans as other local 
authorities, like cities.63  
Although this case diminishes a port district’s authority over 
plan development, it strongly affirms a city’s authority over the 
specifics of LCP policy development, and its implementation of 
approved LCPs through land use and zoning. 
C. City Enactments as “Development” in Context 
The Commission primarily interacts with cities regarding the 
availability of visitor accommodations when the Commission 
reviews an LCP for conformity with the Coastal Act’s policy to 
provide low-cost overnight accommodations.64 The 1981 
amendment to the Coastal Act marks an attempt by legislators to 
narrowly limit the specificity to which the Commission may dictate 
local policies. In San Diego Unified Port District’s case, the 
reviewing court sanctioned the Commission’s ability to identify 
deficiencies in a development proposal and to make specific 
recommendations. However, this ruling turned on the fact that the 
port district was not a city.65 Thus, while courts approve of the 
Commission’s authority to point out deficiencies in a plan 
submitted for approval, courts also recognize that cities deserve 
substantial discretion in dictating specific local policy.66 In other 
words, the Coastal Act grants cities “broad land-use 
implementation and policy-making jurisdiction,” while the 
Commission is prohibited from determining the precise content  
of an LCP.67 
 
 62. Id. at 693. 
 63. Id. at 687. 
 64. See supra Section II.C. 
 65. See supra Section III.B. 
 66. Id. 
 67. San Diego Unified Port Dist., 238 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 689. 
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Courts’ reluctance to allow the Commission to impair 
traditional, municipal land use, business, and nuisance abatement 
jurisdiction in the LCP process should apply even more to the 
Commission’s interpretation of “development.” The Commission’s 
requirement that cities obtain a coastal development permit for 
STLU regulation jettisons the normal LCP approval and 
amendment processes and allows the Commission to directly 
review a city’s application of traditional police power to regulate 
nuisance and business, so long as there is a potential decrease in 
public access. The Commission’s permitting authority is meant to 
ensure that actual coastal “development” conforms with Coastal 
Act policies when there is no LCP, not to allow the Commission to 
dictate how cities regulate potential uses in the coastal zone in their 
own general plan and zoning code as the Commission does now. 
IV. “DEVELOPMENT” 
Because any development in the coastal zone requires a coastal 
development permit, the definition of “development” under the 
Coastal Act is essential to determining the limit of the 
Commission’s regulatory power. California courts tend to agree 
with the Commission’s position that “development” includes a 
broad range of activities. However, courts have not yet provided 
specific direction about the Commission’s inclusion of city 
enactments as “development” subject to Commission review under 
the Coastal Act.68 Courts should not endorse the Commission’s 
broad inclusion of all city ordinances in “development” because 
ordinances only represent a potential change in public access, not 
actual change. STLU ordinances regulating licensing, consumer 
protection, noise, parking, trash, and other nuisance prohibition 
arguably have nothing to do with coastal access. Leaving 
unfettered discretion to the Commission to dictate which homes in 
the coastal zone should be STLUs deprives municipalities of their 
traditional ability to decide which uses are compatible and to 
preserve single-family, owner-occupied housing stock. 
 
 68. But see Greenfield v. Mandalay Shores Cmty. Ass’n, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 827, 828  
(Ct. App. 2018). While the appellate court held that a homeowners’ association’s STLU ban 
constituted “development” under the Coastal Act, courts have yet to rule on whether 
general-application city ordinances constitute “development.” 
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A. “Development” Under the Coastal Act 
The Coastal Act requires that the Coastal Act itself be “liberally 
construed to accomplish its purposes and objectives.”69 Subject to 
courts’ “independent judgment on pure questions of law,”70 “[t]he 
Commission has the ultimate authority to ensure that coastal 
development conforms to the policies embodied in the state’s 
Coastal Act.”71 Unlike most California administrative agencies, the 
Commission’s acts are even exempt from review by California’s 
Office of Administrative Law.72 
The Coastal Act specifically defines “development” somewhat 
broadly. “Development” includes erecting any solid or material 
structure, discharging or disposing dredged materials or waste, 
physically grading or disrupting any material, changing the 
intensity of use of land or water, construction or alteration of a 
structure, or removing major vegetation other than for agricultural 
purposes.73 Thus, the Commission enjoys some statutory leeway in 
interpreting “development.” 
B. Judicial Review of and Deference for Commission Interpretations 
When interpreting statutes, California courts “ascertain the aim 
and goal of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the 
statute.”74 They presume the plain language of the statute governs 
unless the language is unclear or allows for more than one 
reasonable interpretation.75 If the statute is unclear or allows for 
multiple reasonable interpretations, courts look to legislative 
history, public policy, and the evils to be remedied to better 
ascertain the lawmakers’ intent.76 “In such circumstances, [courts] 
must select the construction that comports most closely with the 
aim and goal of the Legislature to promote rather than defeat the 
statute’s general purpose and avoid an interpretation that would 
 
 69. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE ANN. § 30009 (West 2018). 
 70. McAllister v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 365, 372 (Ct. App. 2008). 
 71. City of Dana Point v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 158 Cal. Rptr. 3d 409, 421 (Ct. App. 2013). 
 72. Cal. Coastal Comm’n v. Office of Admin. Law, 258 Cal. Rptr. 560 (Ct. App. 1989). 
 73. CITY ATT’YS’ DEP’T & LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, supra note 17, § 10.329;  
PUB. RES. § 30106. 
 74. Gualala Festivals Comm. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 908, 912  
(Ct. App. 2010). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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lead to absurd and unintended consequences.”77 With respect to 
interpretations of the Coastal Act, courts give the “highest priority 
to environmental considerations.”78 
Reviewing courts in California afford an agency’s 
interpretation of its governing statute “great weight,” but reserve 
final interpretive authority for the courts.79 However, “courts do 
not defer to an agency’s determination when deciding whether the 
agency’s action lies within the scope of authority delegated to it by 
the Legislature.”80 “[T]he issue of whether an agency acted in excess 
of its jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de novo on 
appeal.”81 Thus, the question of whether the Commission’s 
inclusion of city enactments in “development” is proper will 
ultimately be decided de novo by courts, not the Commission, 
because it is a question of jurisdiction.82 
C. Judicial Acceptance of a Broad Interpretation of “Development” 
Although the Commission’s statutory interpretations do not 
receive deference, courts have upheld the Commission’s broad 
interpretation of “development” under the Coastal Act on 
numerous occasions. Examples of accepted interpretations of 
“development” outside those specifically listed in the Coastal Act 
include lot line adjustments, conversion of a storage area into a 
restaurant, conversion of a mobile home park to resident 
ownership, city development of public land, and projects on federal 
land within the coastal zone.83 This Part will focus on two examples, 
namely the inclusion of setting off fireworks and restricting 
historical public access as “development.” 
The word “development” is defined by the list of examples in 
the Coastal Act and not by common usage. For example, California 
courts upheld the Commission’s determination that a fireworks 
display constitutes “development” under the Coastal Act. Gualala 
Festivals Committee, an association of businesses and property 
 
 77. Id. (brackets and citation omitted). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 911–12 (citation omitted). 
 80. Id. at 911 (citation omitted). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See id. 
 83. CITY ATT’YS’ DEP’T & LEAGUE OF CAL. CITIES, supra note 17, § 10.330. 
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owners in Gualala, sought to challenge the Commission’s 
requirement that the committee obtain a coastal development 
permit before discharging a fifteen-minute fireworks display over 
the Gualala River Estuary.84 The court conceded that “a fireworks 
display is not what is commonly regarded as a development of real 
property.”85 But the court ultimately sided with the Commission, 
stating that the legislature did not leave “development” to be 
defined by its common usage.86 Rather, the court pointed to an 
expansive list, provided by the legislature, of activities that 
constitute “development” under the Coastal Act, including the 
discharge of any amount of gaseous or solid waste.87 The court 
reasoned that the Gualala Festivals Committee’s fireworks display 
would likely result in the discharge of solid and chemical waste in 
the Gualala River Estuary and therefore constituted 
“development” under the Coastal Act.88 
“Development” also includes changing the use of private 
property in the coastal zone if the change decreases public access to 
the coast. Martins Beach 1 and Martins Beach 2, two LLCs, 
purchased property over which the public historically enjoyed 
access to the coast for a fee during the daytime.89 The new owners 
initially continued to charge beachgoers for access but eventually 
closed off access completely and painted over the previous owner’s 
beach access sign.90 The Surfrider Foundation, a non-profit 
organization dedicated to preserving the recreational use of 
California’s coast, filed a complaint alleging that the new owners 
engaged in “development” without obtaining a coastal 
development permit as required by the Coastal Act.91 The new 
owners asserted that the property was private and that closing a 
gate and painting over a sign was not “development.”92 But the 
court held that “development” ought to be liberally construed and 
that a significant decrease in public access to beach fits within the 
 
 84. Gualala Festivals, 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 909. 
 85. Id. at 912. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 913. 
 89. Surfrider Found. v. Martins Beach 1, LLC, 221 Cal. Rptr. 3d 382, 388 (Ct. App. 
2017), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 54 (2018). 
 90. Id. at 389. 
 91. Id. at 390. 
 92. Id. at 394. 
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scope of the permitting requirement.93 The gate and the sign 
impaired this access. Thus, the court held the Commission could 
require a coastal development permit even for a change in private 
use if that use decreases public access. 
D. The Difference Between Potential and Actual Changes 
Although courts and the Commission interpret “development” 
broadly, they should not interpret it so broadly as to include 
changes to the potential use of land by city ordinance regardless of 
the physical impacts of that ordinance, especially when the focus of 
that ordinance is in areas traditionally regulated under the city’s 
police power. The Commission currently asserts its authority to 
require cities to obtain a coastal development permit to regulate 
STLUs in areas without LCPs or in areas with LCPs that do not 
contemplate such regulation. The Commission’s position in this 
regard is that STLU regulation “represents a change in the intensity 
of use and of access to the shoreline, and thus constitutes 
development.”94 However, this approach represents a broader 
interpretation of the Commission’s authority, even under the cases 
summarized above. Both a fireworks display and the restriction of 
public travel over private property represent actual changes, while 
a city ordinance represents only a theoretical change. This 
distinction between actual and theoretical changes is critical 
because the primary purpose of the Commission’s permitting 
authority is to prohibit activities that cities otherwise allow (such as 
a fireworks display), not to dictate what activities cities should or 
should not allow.95 
The fireworks display risked almost certain discharge of solid 
waste into the Gualala River Estuary. The Coastal Act specifically 
classifies the discharge of waste, no matter how minimal, as 
“development.”96 Although this seems to stretch the ordinary 
meaning of “development,” as the reviewing court held, it is not a 
surprising interpretation under the Coastal Act’s somewhat broad 
definition. However, if the issue in the Gualala case had been a city 
 
 93. Id. 
 94. Opinion Letter from Cal. Coastal Comm’n to Coastal Planning/Cmty. Dev. Dirs. 
(Dec. 6, 2016). 
 95. See supra Section III.C. 
 96. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE ANN. § 30106 (West 2018). 
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ordinance generally allowing fireworks displays over the estuary, 
the Commission may not have succeeded in exercising exclusive 
jurisdiction over that activity. In this hypothetical, a party wishing 
to shoot fireworks under the city fireworks ordinance would still 
need to obtain a coastal development permit from the Commission. 
The court upheld only the Commission’s traditional authority to 
withhold a permit for an activity that would cause actual discharge 
of waste in the estuary, not a broader authority to prevent the 
creation of a city ordinance that risks theoretical future discharge 
of waste. This difference is key. In other words, the Commission 
has the authority to review and issue permits for actual 
development activities but not for city regulations regulating or 
allowing those activities. 
Similarly, the Martins Beach property owners actually limited 
public access to the coast by closing the entry gate and restricting 
entry. This caused an actual change in the public’s access to water 
as specifically contemplated in the Coastal Act’s definition of 
“development.”97 This case more closely resembles the topic of this 
Note. However, STLU restriction through land use, nuisance, and 
business activity regulation does not actually change the intensity 
of use or access as required by the Coastal Act.98 Rather, STLU 
regulation represents only a potential change to access or use. The 
actual change in access occurs when the property owner changes 
the property’s actual use to conform to any new STLU regulation. 
While it is true that a change in a city’s approach to STLU regulation 
will likely herald in a future reduction in the availability of STLUs, 
this application of Coastal Act authority differs significantly from 
regulating actual public access to the beach in the Martins Beach 
case. The court upheld the Commission’s authority to withhold a 
permit from a private property owner changing public access to the 
beach, not a broader authority to prevent a city ordinance that 
poses a theoretical future decrease in public access to the shore 
regardless of whether it relates to actual access to the coast or 
simply nuisance prevention. 
The Commission’s current practice of requiring cities to obtain 
coastal development permits to regulate STLUs under an expansive 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
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interpretation of “development” exceeds the limited authority 
granted by the Coastal Act. Under the Coastal Act, the 
Commission’s interaction with cities is primarily limited to quasi-
judicial review of proposed LCPs.99 Cities enjoy substantial 
discretion when determining the contents of their LCPs, while the 
Commission is intended to take a backseat role.100 Outside of the 
LCP approval process, the Commission is meant to act as a stopgap 
to prohibit actual “development” activities that are otherwise 
allowed by cities’ zoning codes, over which the Commission has no 
jurisdiction. However, the Commission’s broad interpretation of 
“development” to include potential changes in use, such as those 
posed by zoning ordinances, allows the Commission to directly 
oversee city zoning ordinances in a way not contemplated in the 
Coastal Act. With respect to city zoning ordinances, courts should 
preserve cities’ independent authority to regulate city affairs in the 
absence of an approved LCP and should limit the Commission’s 
authority to that which is outlined in the Coastal Act—namely to 
fill gaps in lax local zoning codes—by interpreting “development” 
to include only actual changes in use. 
E. Absurd Outgrowth 
California courts have stated that they will not construe the 
Coastal Act so liberally as to allow for absurd applications.101 The 
Commission’s broad interpretation of “development” to include 
STLU restrictions leads to absurd consequences when put in the 
context of Martins Beach. 
The Commission stretches the definition of “development” 
when it includes STLU regulations because such regulations 
potentially restrict access to overnight accommodations. If any 
change in the availability of residential homes as overnight 
accommodations constitutes “development,” the Commission 
could require private property owners, like Martins Beach’s 
owners, to obtain coastal development permits to stop renting their 
 
 99. Anthem Sales & Mgmt., LLC v. City of San Clemente, No. SACV 18-01359-
CJC(JDEx), at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2018). 
 100. San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 238 Cal. Rptr. 3d 671, 688 
(Ct. App. 2018). 
 101. Gualala Festivals Comm. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 908, 912  
(Ct. App.  2010). 
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property as an STLU. This assertion of authority is not unthinkable 
in light of Martins Beach. There, the court upheld the Commission’s 
authority to curb traditional private property rights in order to 
maintain public access to the coast. However, it seems absurd to 
require a property owner to obtain a permit to live in her own home 
instead of renting it as an STLU. 
Although it is uncertain whether the Commission would ever 
require a property owner to obtain a permit to occupy her own 
home, the Commission does prevent cities from requiring owners 
to occupy their homes—even though this would be an exercise of 
the city’s traditional police power. Cities’ police power allows them 
to protect neighborhood character and health by requiring owner 
occupancy or restricting commercial uses, such as STLU rental. The 
Commission, however, asserts that it has the authority to negate 
city ordinances that restrict STLUs as “development” and to allow 
unfettered commercial STLU lodging throughout the coastal zone. 
Taking this assertion a step further, the Commission could 
neutralize cities’ ability to prevent the complete commercialization 
and ultimate deterioration of coastal neighborhood communities 
through conversion of single-family homes to STLUs because the 
Commission has no obligation under the Coastal Act to protect 
community character or welfare. Allowing the Commission to 
trigger its coastal development permitting authority to negate city 
ordinances as “development” would be an immense grant of power 
and would put coastal neighborhoods at risk. 
V. CHALLENGES TO THE STATUS QUO 
Several cities have challenged the Commission’s current 
practice of overseeing STLU regulations as “development” in the 
coastal zone. However, no case squarely addresses the proper 
balance between city authority and Commission oversight and the 
proper definition of “development.” 
A. Hermosa Beach 
In a recent unpublished opinion, California’s Second District 
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the City of Hermosa Beach, 
whose ordinance banned STLUs in residential areas altogether but 
allowed them in commercial areas. The plaintiffs, who sought to 
continue renting out their properties as STLUs, argued that the 
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city’s ban violated the policies of the Coastal Act to provide low-
cost overnight accommodations.102 The court held that the policy 
sections of the Coastal Act only set standards under which an LCP 
is reviewed for adequacy and that there is “no authority applying 
these provisions to zoning ordinances enacted pursuant to a city’s 
police powers.”103 In other words, the City reserves its traditional 
regulatory powers in areas of coastal jurisdiction. The court also 
held that the absence of an approved LCP did not eliminate the 
City’s “ability to enact and amend zoning ordinances.”104 However, 
in this case, plaintiffs had conceded at trial that zoning ordinances 
did not constitute “development” under the Coastal Act.105 The 
court was unpersuaded by plaintiffs’ submission of Commission 
opinion documents declaring STLU bans a violation of the  
Coastal Act.106 
This case stands for a city’s ability to regulate STLUs in areas 
lacking an approved LCP. The Commission’s preemptive authority 
extends only to LCP approval and development activity 
permitting. The coastal zone does not revert to anarchy in the 
absence of an approved LCP; cities retain jurisdiction over local 
affairs. It also stands for the fact that cities without an LCP need 
only get coastal development permits for “development” in the 
coastal zone, not underlying traditional zoning regulations.  
However, this case is peculiar for several reasons. First, the 
opinion is unpublished and therefore will not have any 
precedential control over the issue of future city STLU regulation. 
That being said, the opinion still signals a potential willingness 
from the court to affirm cities’ authority to enact zoning ordinances, 
like STLU bans, without an approved LCP or LCP amendment. 
Second, the court’s ruling did not touch on the issue of city 
ordinances, like STLU regulations, constituting “development” 
because plaintiffs conceded that they were not. Thus, the opinion 
does not give much guidance on the merits of this broad 
interpretation of “development.” The fact that plaintiffs conceded 
the issue may indicate that city ordinances are at least not  
 
 102. Johnston v. City of Hermosa Beach, B278424, 2018 WL 458920, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018). 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at *5. 
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clear-cut “development.” Lastly, the court noted that the 
Commission had not sought to intervene in the case at the trial or 
appellate levels.107 This fact may signal that the Commission knows 
that the position described in its opinion documents is untenable, 
and the Commission did not want to see this case establish 
precedential value as a reported appellate decision. Alternatively, 
this may indicate that the real battle between cities and the 
Commission over the interpretation of “development” is still yet  
to come. 
B. Mandalay Shores 
Greenfield v. Mandalay Shores Community Ass’n reached a 
contrary result. In this case, homeowners who wanted to lease out 
their homes as vacation rentals sued their homeowners’ association 
over the association’s resolution banning STLUs in the 
community.108 The homeowners argued that the association’s STLU 
ban constituted “development” because it changed the intensity of 
access to single-family residential homes in the coastal zone.109 
Therefore, the association needed to obtain a coastal development 
permit before limiting STLUs.110 The appellate court held that the 
use of homes as STLUs is a matter for cities and the Commission to 
regulate, not for private actors like the association.111 The court also 
upheld the trial court’s finding that “arguably the public will be 
restricted in its access to the coast” and held that the STLU ban 
constituted “development.”112 
While the court’s interpretation of “development” does not 
bode well for city ordinances that outright ban STLUs, the holding 
could be narrowly construed to restrict a homeowners’ 
association’s ability to ban STLUs. This ruling does not touch on 
cities imposing reasonable restrictions on STLUs short of an 
outright ban. In fact, the court explicitly stated that cities, in concert 
with the Commission, are better-suited to enact STLU regulations 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Greenfield v. Mandalay Shores Cmty. Ass’n, 230 Cal. Rptr. 3d 827 (Ct. App. 2018), 
rev. denied (June 13, 2018). 
 109. Id. at 828. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 828–29. 
 112. Id. at 831 (citing Greenfield v. Mandalay Shores Cmty. Ass’n, No. 56-2016-
00485246-CU-MC-VTA (Aug. 12, 2016). 
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or bans.113 However, the court did not specifically discuss the 
proper interplay between the Commission and cities in regulating 
STLUs or whether municipal police powers allow locational limits 
on STLUs. 
C. Homeaway and Santa Monica 
In Homeaway.com, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, Homeaway, a 
service similar to Airbnb, challenged a Santa Monica city ordinance 
requiring that hosts be present for the duration of their guests’ stay, 
and that Homeaway not book a rental unit that is not on  
Santa Monica’s STLU registry.114 Homeaway procedurally and 
substantively challenged the ordinance on the grounds that it 
“restrains coastal access” without the authority of a coastal 
development permit.115 Santa Monica defended its ordinance, 
citing STLUs’ threat to the supply of affordable housing and the 
character of its neighborhoods.116 Homeaway argued that Santa 
Monica’s land use plan, as approved by the Commission under the 
Coastal Act, did not contemplate limits on STLUs. Therefore, 
enacting an ordinance that limits STLUs requires either a land use 
plan amendment that has been reviewed by the Commission, or a 
coastal development permit for “development,” also reviewed by 
the Commission.117 
While not ruling on the land use plan amendment issue, the 
U.S. District Court held that Homeaway had not sufficiently 
convinced the court that “development” includes “every possible 
change in the law that might result in a change to land use” to 
justify an injunction.118 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently 
affirmed the decision without reaching the merits of Homeaway’s 
claims. Because Homeaway was filing for an injunction against 
Santa Monica and primarily relied on opinion documents from the 
Commission, the briefing and ruling are not specific enough to 
definitively put the issue of STLU regulation to rest. 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Homeaway.com, Inc. v. City of Santa Monica, No. 2:16-cv-06641-ODW, 2018 WL 
1281772, at *1–2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2018). 
 115. Id. at *4. 
 116. Id. at *2. 
 117. Id. at *4 
 118. Id. 
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This case indicates that federal district courts may be skeptical 
of the Commission’s position that all STLU regulations constitute 
“development” under the Coastal Act. This case also directly 
conflicts with the Mandalay Shores court’s position on the correct 
interpretation of “development.” One way to reconcile the rulings 
is that the regulation at issue in Mandalay Shores was an outright 
ban posing actual changes in use, whereas Santa Monica  
only imposed restrictions posing a theoretical change in  
access, depending on whether long- or short-term occupancy  
affected access. 
D. San Clemente 
In July 2018, a property owner challenged San Clemente’s STLU 
regulations, arguing that the regulations violated the Coastal Act.119 
The ordinances limited STLUs to certain zones within the city that 
are proximate to commercial facilities and public transportation.120 
The Commission had not approved the specific regulations. 
Plaintiffs argued that the ordinances constituted “development” 
without a coastal development permit and sought an injunction to 
block their enforcement.121 Dismissing the application for relief, the 
court held that the Commission’s function with respect to cities is 
limited by the Coastal Act to quasi-judicial review of LCPs and 
issuing coastal development permits until an LCP is approved.122 
However, the Coastal Act does not preempt cities’ constitutional 
police power absent a clear conflict.123 The court held that a change 
in local regulations governing the potential use of land does not 
constitute “development” under the Coastal Act.124 
This case is a district court ruling and a review of likelihood of 
outcomes in a pre-trial motion for an injunction and is therefore not 
precedentially binding. However, it provides another example of 
courts’ unwillingness to consider any and all local regulations as 
“development” under the Coastal Act and thus preempted by 
 
 119. Anthem Sales & Mgmt., LLC v. City of San Clemente, No. SACV 18-01359-
CJC(JDEx), at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2018). 
 120. Id. at *3. 
 121. Id. at *6. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
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Commission authority. This case also directly conflicts with the 
interpretation of “development” in Mandalay Shores. However, 
again, San Clemente’s ordinances did not outright ban STLUs, and 
the authority issuing the restriction was a city, not a private entity. 
The source of authority is especially important in light of the court’s 
statement that the Coastal Act does not preempt cities’ police 
power absent clear conflict, whereas homeowners’ associations do 
not enjoy such restricted oversight from the Commission. 
E. Case Consolidation 
Although controlling precedent, Mandalay Shores seems to be an 
easily distinguishable outlier from the Santa Monica and San 
Clemente cases. First, the court in Mandalay Shores dealt with an 
STLU ban under authority derived from private ownership. This 
more closely resembles Martins Beach in which a private owner 
restricted access through their own private property. In contrast, 
Santa Monica and San Clemente’s STLU restrictions were enacted 
under traditional city police power. Second, neither Santa Monica 
nor San Clemente’s restrictions constituted outright STLU bans. In 
contrast, the Mandalay Shores homeowners’ association outright 
banned STLUs in their community. Third, while the court in 
Mandalay Shores readily accepted the inclusion of homeowners’ 
association STLU bans in their interpretation of “development” 
under the Coastal Act, courts reviewing city STLU restrictions 
refused to do so. This could indicate a willingness on the courts’ 
part to balance the Commission’s authority to preserve coastal 
access against cities’ traditional authority to regulate land use, land 
use adjacencies, and the general public welfare through business 
regulations and use regulations. 
The court in Mandalay Shores took an aggressive stance on the 
interpretation of development under the Coastal Act. Not only  
does this lead to absurd consequences as described above, but it 
reduces cities’ traditional police authority to combat threats to  
public welfare. 
Mandalay Shores, Martins Beach, and the Commission’s inclusion 
of city ordinances in “development” represent a troubling trend. 
All three exemplify the Commission’s assumed authority to 
prevent people from doing nothing with their land, or in other 
words, its assumed authority to require that people allow public 
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access to their land. Although the statutory definition of 
“development” is broad, it should not be so broad as to give the 
Commission near general police power over the coastal zone, either 
by directly prohibiting property owners’ actions or tailoring city 
ordinances through the coastal development permitting process. 
This is a stark departure from the backseat role envisioned in 
Hermosa Beach, in which the Commission’s preemptive authority 
over city affairs is limited to LCP approval and development 
permitting, not full police power. 
VI. STLU EXTERNALITIES 
Courts have yet to rule definitively on whether local STLU 
regulations constitute “development” under the Coastal Act. 
However, courts should eliminate this legal ambiguity in favor of 
acknowledging some use of city police power to allow cities to 
address significant threats to public welfare posed by STLUs. 
STLUs pose a threat to the supply of affordable housing, disrupt 
community character, and generate nuisance complaints. 
A. STLUs Threaten Public Welfare 
STLUs pose a variety of threats to public welfare. STLUs 
threaten the supply of affordable housing, threaten community 
character, and lead to neighbor nuisance complaints. These threats 
to public welfare must be stopped by STLU regulation. 
STLUs threaten cities’ ability to provide affordable housing. 
Each home converted to an STLU is essentially removed from the 
market and added to cities’ hotel supply.125 This not only decreases 
the housing supply in coastal communities but can also lead to rent 
increases and pressure on owners occupying their own homes to 
convert them to STLU uses.126 In San Francisco, one quarter of 
vacant homes in 2015 were filled by short-term renters, rather than 
left available as affordable housing to potential buyers or  
long-term renters.127 
The housing market and development constraints in already 
crowded areas of the coastal zone provide no ready safety valves  
 
 125. Lee, supra note 7, at 230. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Cloonan, supra note 4, at 46. 
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to adequately offset these quick market changes eliminating  
long-term housing availability.128 
So long as a property owner or leaseholder can rent out a room on 
Airbnb for cheaper than the price of a hotel room, while earning 
a substantial premium over the residential market . . . there is  
an overpowering incentive to list each unit in a building  
on Airbnb . . . . This . . . spurs displacement, gentrification,  
and segregation.129 
The only real way to curb the effects of this overpowering 
market incentive is to offset it by regulations limiting the 
conversion of long-term housing to short-term vacation rentals.130 
STLUs also pose a threat to community character. While the 
actual nature of a community’s character is debatable, California’s 
Sixth District Court of Appeals held that the “residential character” 
of a community is threatened when a significant amount of the 
homes are converted to STLU use.131 Such primarily transient uses 
threaten the neighborhood’s stability: 
Short-term tenants have little interest in public agencies or in the 
welfare of the citizenry. They do not participate in local 
government, coach little league, or join the hospital guild. They 
do not lead a scout troop, volunteer at the library, or keep an eye 
on an elderly neighbor. Literally, they are here today and gone 
tomorrow—without engaging in the sort of activities that weld 
and strengthen a community.132 
While it is difficult to differentiate the potential effects 
threatened by STLU guests (under thirty days) from thirty-one-day 
renters (a constitutionally protected use of property), cities 
regulating STLUs have assumed that neighborhood stability  
and owner investment are linked to neighbor-to-neighbor 
accountability, pride of ownership, and related public  
welfare considerations.133 
 
 128. Lee, supra note 7, at 235. 
 129. Id. at 230. 
 130. Cloonan, supra note 4, at 47. 
 131. Ewing v. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea, 286 Cal. Rptr. 382, 388 (Ct. App. 1991). In this 
case, the court loosely held that twelve percent of homes rented as STLUs was a significant 
enough amount to threaten the character of the community. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Cloonan, supra note 4, at 45. 
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STLU popularity often leads to a variety of neighbor 
complaints. Permanent residents see STLUs in their neighborhoods 
as sources of extraordinary noise, trash, and crime.134 Others 
complain of scarce parking being taken up by travelers and  
party-goers.135 More specific complaints include “dealing with 
loose dogs on their lawn, seeing people littering and hearing 
drunken fights in the early morning hours.”136 Cities even complain 
that increased commercial activity in residential areas from STLUs 
strains local police, fire, and medical emergency resources.137 
STLU hosts maintain that their guests are peaceful and neat and 
that transients’ impacts on neighborhoods are indistinguishable 
from the impacts of long-term residents.138 Others argue that STLU 
guests do not pose any increased nuisance threat compared to 
everyday bad neighbors. Both produce noise, trash, crime, parked 
cars, dogs, and fights.139 However, STLU guests differ in that they 
do not suffer any kind of reputational sanctions for upsetting 
neighborhood residents. Everyday bad neighbors, on the other 
hand, must face their neighbors at some point and account for their 
behavior. STLU guests can just leave at week’s end. 
B. Threat Abatement 
Cities are well-suited and empowered to deal with the dynamic 
threats to public welfare posed by STLUs. Under their police 
power, cities have broad constitutional authority to address STLUs’ 
threat to public welfare by regulating behaviors such as noise and 
parking through nuisance regulations or by setting locational 
criteria that sites uses where they are most compatible. By contrast, 
the Commission has one mission only: to hold the California coast 
 
 134. Id. at 43. 
 135. Valerie Osier, Potential Short-Term Rental Regulations Worry Long Beach Hosts, LONG 
BEACH POST (July 21, 2018), https://lbpost.com/news/city/potential-short-term-rental-
regulations-worry-long-beach-hosts/. 
 136. Cloonan, supra note 4, at 43 (quoting Amanda May Metzger, Residents Make 
Arguments on Short-Term Rentals, POSTSTAR (Aug. 20, 2014), http://poststar.com/news/ 
local/residents-make-arguments-on-short-term-rentals/article_2298004a-27ed-11e4-aa33-
0019bb2963f4.html). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Phil Diehl, Coastal Commission Tells Del Mar to Expand Short-Term Rentals, SAN 
DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (June 17, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/ 
communities/north-county/sd-no-short-rentals-20180614-story.html. 
 139. Id. 
005.SMITH_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/5/20  10:00 PM 
1369 California Coastal Commission and Overnight Accommodations 
 1397 
 
in public trust by using the Coastal Act and its policies to provide 
greater physical access, to limit development impairing that access, 
and to expand visitor accommodations wherever possible. The 
Coastal Act only obligates the Commission to consider STLU 
regulations’ effects on public access, not the general public welfare. 
Cities address STLUs’ threat to the supply of affordable 
housing by imposing durational limits. A durational limit may take 
the form of a fixed number of days per year a host can rent out their 
home.140 This type of regulation addresses the problem of investors 
purchasing property solely to convert it to year-round STLU use by 
requiring at least some owner occupation during the course of the 
year, even when that occupation is less profitable.141 This regulation 
also incentivizes property owners to occupy their properties for the 
rest of the year, rather than leaving them vacant in the off-season. 
Although this type of limitation might decrease the amount of 
available STLUs during certain seasons, it would not actually 
decrease affordable accommodations if the STLUs would otherwise 
normally be left vacant. Durational limits can also protect 
community character because they force STLU owners to occupy 
their homes for part of the year and reduces the amount of  
transient traffic. 
Cities can address nuisance concerns by imposing a minimum-
length stay.142 For example, a three-day minimum stay requirement 
essentially forces guests to stay for an entire weekend and 
diminishes the “weekday rentals that likely annoy permanent 
residents.”143 Although this type of limitation could theoretically 
decrease public access to overnight accommodations for fewer than 
three days, it would not likely decrease the gross total amount of 
available STLUs. 
Occupancy limitations can serve to limit the nuisance impact of 
STLU guests and protect community character. Occupancy limits 
dictate the maximum amount of people who can stay at a given 
STLU or even the amount of people allowed to be present at an 
STLU at the same time.144 These types of limits prevent the raucous 
 
 140. Cloonan, supra note 4, at 47–48. 
 141. Id. at 48. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 50. 
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parties or spring break getaways that bother neighbors.145 Other 
occupancy limits may require a host to be present on an STLU 
property during guests’ rental period.146 However, STLU guests 
seem to prefer rentals of the entire residence, without a host 
present.147 Therefore, this type of regulation would likely result in 
a decrease in STLU traffic. 
City location limitations can prevent STLUs’ adverse effects on 
primarily residential neighborhoods’ community character. 
Location limitations can function as a part of normal zoning 
ordinances or fit as a part of a permitting process.148 This type of 
regulation prevents STLU impacts on neighbors by limiting STLU 
use to areas that can accommodate visitors. It can also benefit 
consumers by giving them better access to transportation  
and restaurants. 
While cities have the power to address STLUs’ threat to public 
welfare in a variety of ways, the Commission is only obligated to 
provide public access.149 The Commission has a statutory mandate 
and authority only to ensure that the Coastal Act’s policies are 
carried out.150 The Commission has no obligation in the current 
regulatory scheme to consider STLU effects on the affordable 
housing supply, nuisance, and threats to community character. 
These issues are best left to local communities to regulate with their 
concurrent police power jurisdiction. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
While the proper balance between the Commission’s authority 
to preempt city STLU restrictions and cities’ police power remains 
unclear, public welfare considerations fall through the cracks of the 
current regulatory scheme. Although courts have historically 
interpreted “development” broadly, an interpretation that includes 
 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 51. 
 149. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE ANN. § 30001.5(c) (West 2018). This is an oversimplification. 
The Coastal Act sets out many policies. However, the Commission asserts its authority  
to permit city STLU restrictions under the Coastal Act’s policy to provide  
overnight accommodations. 
 150. San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 238 Cal. Rptr. 3d 671,  
692–94 (Ct. App. 2018). 
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normal city regulations of nuisance and business, as the 
Commission suggests, would severely hinder cities’ ability to 
respond to significant threats to public welfare. 
The Commission’s current prioritization of public access 
through STLUs over all else poses serious consequences for cities. 
Even if “development” is eventually construed so broadly as to 
include everyday city STLU limitations, a Coastal Act amendment 
or new state regulation could correct this imbalance by requiring 
the Commission to consider important city objectives in addition to 
the Coastal Act’s policy of increasing overnight accommodations 
through STLUs. Such a change would prevent the Commission 
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